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Abstract
Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), an instrument of international trade and
investment law, today leads perceptions regarding the integrity of international dispute
resolution and its administration. If confidence in international economic institutions to
render judgements which are impartial to political influences become suspect, then their
durability will erode. This inquiry investigates whether or not power imbalances are
reflected inordinately within ISDS arbitration outcomes between host nations and their
foreign investors. Although there have been clear instances which question any
observer’s view of ISDS impartiality, these outcomes have also served to distort a
complicated fabric of case results that have changed and evolved both in time and place.
By comparing results from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development’s
(UNCTAD) International Investment Database with the newly created International
Investment Agreement (IIA) Mapping Project, it is now possible to test for correlational
evidence between ISDS decisions and the presence of savings provision clauses. These
clauses have been presented by ISDS proponents as a corrective measure with the power
to restore legal faith in international judicial outcomes. With the creation of a nearly
comprehensive and originally curated dataset, analysis reveals a modest but measurable
correlation between the presence of savings provisions and the decision of ISDS
arbitration to be decided in favor of a state. These findings and the additional qualitative
analysis given here, bolster support for the inclusion of savings provisions as a
meaningful improvement in investor-state contractual defense and the maintenance of
international confidence regarding the durability of international economic institutions.
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Chapter One – Introduction to Study
1.1 Inquiry Introduction
Proponents of institutionalism have argued since the end of the Second World
War that global cooperation and the establishment of shared institutions- particularly
those that administer trade and investment, facilitate collective-action solutions in a more
constructive and sustainable way. As the next decade begins, our international legal and
financial institutions have seen significant failures in confidence. A growing sense of
distrust and fears of manipulation by the powerful have aided this erosion in trust. As the
World Trade Organization (WTO) nears global inclusion, the United States has begun to
discuss its abandonment. Have international institutions delivered on a lasting
framework for sovereign states to seek positive sum gains, uniting their economic
interdependence in ways that reduce uncertainty and prevent conflict? Or do today’s antiglobalist, anti-institutionalist and anti-corporate sentiments illustrate that the project can
no longer meaningfully deliver? This paper analyzes one major debate regarding the
durability of international governance in the realm of investment and trade: the efficacy
of contractual language in alleviating bias associated with Investor State Dispute
Settlement (ISDS) arbitration.
ISDS, a little-known clause that exists within the majority of International
Investment Agreements (IIAs), provides foreign investors an arbitrational alternative to
host country court systems when disputes arise. As a crucial component of international
investment and trade governance, the study of ISDS administration provides a measure
by which to gauge the validity of grievances contributing to declines in confidence.
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As the debate grows around whether or not justice is being fairly served by global
institutions such as the United Nations, World Bank or WTO, all of which offer their own
version of ISDS facilitation, the risks increase for decreased participation. However, if in
spite of national power and political economy imbalances, international trade and
investment administration and judicial outcomes are seen to fairly adjudicate disputes and
protect the sovereign rights of states, such as the right to regulate in the public interest,
then participation within these institutions may remain robust. Recent concerns derailing
the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the delaying of the Comprehensive Economic
and Trade Agreement (CETA) have illustrated that these debates are resulting in
significant economic disruption.
Proponents of ISDS who champion the positive effects it can help facilitate, see it
as a necessary mechanism by which a ‘private right of action’ can take place to safeguard
and therefore encourage foreign investment. They charge that concerns over expediency,
particularly with regards to regulatory chilling effects (RCE), are vastly overstated and
that a lack of adequate ‘savings provision’ inclusions are to blame. Proponents, notably
Dr. Gary Hufbauer of the Peterson Institute, have stated that the more recent inclusion of
adequate savings provisions within agreements has largely rectified any previous cause
for concern. Detractors have claimed these clauses are irrelevant, as the real issue exists
within economic power disparity and its delegitimizing influence on any established
legalism claimed by the administering courts. Christian Côté of the London School of
Economics has provided recent evidence for this, which has been cited widely by
detractors as proof ISDS is irreversibly flawed.
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Compounding the growing distrust of these international arbitration mechanisms
and their courts, are the popular detracting arguments which have more widely found
their way into the media. In 2014, the Economist had this to say about ISDS:
IF YOU wanted to convince the public that international trade agreements are a
way to let multinational companies get rich at the expense of ordinary people, this
is what you would do: give foreign firms a special right to apply to a secretive
tribunal of highly paid corporate lawyers for compensation whenever a
government passes a law to, say, discourage smoking, protect the environment or
prevent a nuclear catastrophe. Yet that is precisely what thousands of trade and
investment treaties over the past half century have done, through a process known
as “investor-state dispute settlement”, or ISDS. (para. 1)

In order to decipher whether or not regulatory influence and concerns of
international legal durability will ultimately doom the future of third-party arbitration and
the potential gains it brings, it is critical to determine the actual effect of savings
provisions on regulatory freedoms and their impact on case outcomes.
If savings provisions can indeed be shown to adequately empower a state’s ability
to defend itself legally in an international tribunal, regardless of economic wealth
disparity, then proponents of international legalism and investment administration have
solid ground to stand on. If they are not adequately shown to provide sufficient protection
however, and in fact the outcomes of ISDS disputes are due instead largely to macropower dynamics, then it will be worth concluding that savings provisions do not protect
countries adequately and that international legalism does indeed still struggle with
influences it cannot control. If international arbitration tribunals are not seen to provide
equitable protection to host nations in this regard, then international institutionalism itself
will suffer a loss in confidence as a result- as less and not more countries will choose to
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weave themselves into the expanding global and legal framework that fosters the
positive-sum aspirations which brought it about in the first place.
This paper seeks to demonstrate the effects of introducing more defined
provisions within International Investment Agreements (IIAs), Bilateral Investment
Treaties (BITs) and Multilateral Trade Agreements (MTAs), such as the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement
(CETA) or the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT). By comparing the arbitrational outcomes of
all 2,443 ISDS cases in which savings provisions were found to either be present in or
not, this paper looks to identify if a correlation exists between the presence of contractual
language invoking a ‘right to regulate’ (a savings provision) and the distribution of cases
decided in favor of States over investors.
In building upon work that has already demonstrated a measurable link between
the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of a home respondent state and the arbitrational
outcome, this study specifically investigates whether or not an interactive relationship
exists between the difference in respondent-state wealth vs. plaintiff-state wealth in the
year arbitration was initiated, and the presence of a savings provision described in either
the preamble or elsewhere in the body of the agreement being invoked. By providing
thorough descriptive and historical context, a wide and current literature review, a
qualitative and quantitative analysis of cases, this thesis provides a clearer picture of the
ISDS debate and supplies findings which speak to its future as a bellwether for
international legalism.

5

1.2 Reason for this study
Empirical evidence analyzing the record of ISDS cases available have provided
new quantitative insights to the discussions around regulatory effects and ISDS. Work
done by Christine Côté and others offer compelling evidence to support the theory that
economic disparity does indeed play some role in adjudicated outcomes (Côté, 2014).
Gary Hufbauer and proponents of ISDS’s viability, in terms of fairness of treatment
during arbitration outcome, suggest instead that previous inadequacies stemmed from the
lack of sufficient contractual design needed to prevent exploitation. These contractual
design protections have been specifically identified as the inclusion of savings provisions
(Hufbauer, 2015; 2019). According to Hufbauer’s assessment, the current multitude of
recorded outcomes in cases now reflect this change, as seen in the decline of abuses
described by Côté and others. While there is evidence of this when examined along a
temporal progression of cases, the ability now to quantify cases in a comprehensive
manner using data provided by the newly created UNCTAD IIA Mapping Project, a
testable component to this evaluation now presents itself.
Two major concerns over ISDS have emerged and are analyzed here. The first is
whether or not ISDS disputes are adjudicated fairly, regardless of political economy; and
second, whether or not the inclusion of a savings provision provides measurable effects in
the outcome of ISDS disputes. In a comprehensive analysis of nearly all current ISDS
cases publicly available, this study addresses both concerns by analyzing two major
variables: discrepancies in GDP between plaintiff and respondent states, and the presence
of a savings provision clause. The findings here conclude that national wealth imbalances
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may play an extremely small role in predicting ISDS case outcomes, but outside the
accepted statistically significant ranges. Secondly, it finds that the presence of a savings
provision clause significantly affects both the outcome of an ISDS dispute, as well as
drastically reducing the number of challenges a treaty containing such clauses may face.
Of specific note, is that the Average Marginal Effects (AMEs) reveal a negative
association to savings provision inclusion. This may be explainable in terms of
performing a hard test on the variable that does not take fully into account the impact of
those cases deterred entirely from arbitration by savings provisions. The findings here
thus contribute overall to a more nuanced understanding of the strengths and weaknesses
regarding international institutionalism, as it concerns international trade and investment
practices.
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Chapter Two – Introduction to Topic
2.1 Introduction to ISDS Arbitration
The following section serves to provide a general Investor State Dispute
Settlement (ISDS) overview. ISDS itself is best defined as a legal mechanism embedded
within contracts to serve as a previously agreed upon resolution process, and as such can
take many different forms. The forms ISDS can take vary depending on the legal
frameworks chosen- either as designed and utilized from prior frameworks, or on an ad
hoc basis.

2.2 The Actors Involved
Investors
Multinational corporations (MNCs), small to medium enterprises (SMEs) and
private investors are just some of the interested parties who seek investor protection
abroad. These investors seek to include protectionist mechanisms such as ISDS in various
international trade and investment agreements, mainly as a means of trying to safeguard
property rights (Hufbauer, 2015). Local court arbitration involving the expropriation of
property owned by foreign entities, are not always deemed as impartial. Evidence for or
against these sentiments is likewise not deemed impartial, relegating most qualitative
evidence as anecdotal opinion. 1

Further investigation/reading on the topic, the book examines Latin American country abuse by foreign
investors. Collins, David. (2013, March 14). The BRIC States and Outward Foreign Direct Investment.
OUP, Oxford.
1
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States
States often concede to ISDS third party international judicial systems with the
belief that in doing so, they will generate greater investment from abroad 2. It is with this
interest in mind, that more than 150 countries around the world have signed the ICSID
Convention. There are only a few states which have not signed treaties which include
some form of an ISDS arbitration mechanism. There are, however, some states which
have refused ISDS clauses but who still secure sizable foreign investment. The two
biggest examples for this include Brazil and Japan. Overall though, FTAs and BITs that
allow investors to seek redress through private right of action courts such as ISDS are by
far the norm in international investing. These ISDS bound treaties today number around
3,000 worldwide (European Commission, 2015).
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has contributed
substantially to the record of cases brought through ISDS, in terms of both applicable
members and sheer volume of cases that have been generated through its Chapter 11. The
United States, for its part, has alone been a party to more than 50 direct agreements which
include ISDS (USTR, 2015). The countries for whom ISDS is invoked against the most
include Colombia, India and Spain. According to the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce
(SCC) ISDS blog, Colombia, India and Spain have been the most recurring respondents
to date for the occurrence of ISDS activation (SCC, 2016). However, it must be noted
that today Canada is the most sued nation by these tribunals (Freeman, 2015). The US

There is some challenging academic research against this, including the investment history of Brazil
which often excludes ISDS from IIAs.
2
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and the Netherlands are the most common home States from which investors have
launched cases (SCC, 2016).

Court
The World Bank’s International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID) is the international arbitration institution of choice for most ISDS cases heard,
and currently facilitates the vast majority of these (SCC, 2016). ICSID was created in
1965 and established to operate as a part of the World Bank. It was generated with the
creation of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of Other States (known as the ICSID Convention or Washington Convention).
ICSID is described as being an “impartial international forum providing facilities for
arbitration of international investment disputes,” and one that “does not by itself arbitrate
disputes but provides the rules and procedures for independent arbitration tribunals to
resolve disputes,” ad hoc (Latham & Watkins, 2017).

Judicial Body
Judicial bodies exist as three member tribunals within ICSID; each party chooses
one judicial member, while a third is chosen by both the plaintiff and respondent party. A
preselected list of arbiters is often made available for selection from a World Bank panel,
a source of criticism by ISDS detractors. Arbiters can be independently chosen by either
party involved however, as long as requirements are met. Most often professional
corporate lawyers serve in these roles, often from a small and rotating pool of colleagues
with familiarity with the ICSID procedural process.
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Defense
Representation during arbitration itself is often handled by legal teams who
represent states and investors separately. Adequate representation in ISDS disputes
frequently costs between $600 - $800 (USD)/hour, and thereby contributes greatly to the
overall cost incurred (Economist, 2014). The specificity required by ICSID standards for
representation, which include strict rules concerning an arbiter’s nationality and
qualifications, consequently maintains these high costs for participants. Restrictions for
representation and judicial selection are described in the ICSID charter’s section 4 as
follows.
Section 4 of Charter, ‘The Panels’
Article 12
The Panel of Conciliators and the Panel of Arbitrators shall each consist of
qualified persons, designated as hereinafter provided, who are willing to serve
thereon.
Article 13
(1) Each Contracting State may designate to each Panel four persons who
may but need not be its nationals.
(2) The Chairman may designate ten persons to each Panel. The persons
so designated to a Panel shall each have a different nationality.
Article 14
(1) Persons designated to serve on the Panels shall be persons of high
moral character and recognized competence in the fields of law, commerce,
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industry or finance, who may be relied upon to exercise independent judgment.
Competence in the field of law shall be of particular importance in the case of
persons on the Panel of Arbitrators.
(2) The Chairman, in designating persons to serve on the Panels, shall in
addition pay due regard to the importance of assuring representation on the Panels
of the principal legal systems of the world and of the main forms of economic
activity.
Article 15
(1) Panel members shall serve for renewable periods of six years.
(2) In case of death or resignation of a member of a Panel, the authority
which designated the member shall have the right to designate another person to
serve for the remainder of that member's term.
(3) Panel members shall continue in office until their successors have been
designated.
Article 16
(1) A person may serve on both Panels.
(2) If a person shall have been designated to serve on the same Panel by
more than one Contracting State, or by one or more Contracting States and the
Chairman, he shall be deemed to have been designated by the authority which
first designated him or, if one such authority is the State of which he is a national,
by that State.
(3) All designations shall be notified to the Secretary-General and shall
take effect from the date on which the notification is received.
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The arbiters/lawyers are permitted to rotate between positions and can serve many
different roles at the same time. There has been criticism that this frequently allows for
conflicts of interest and incentivizes arbiters to elongate their cases (Wellhausen, 2016).
Proponents of the selection process, instead, stress that the design intent seeks to achieve
the highest level of neutrality for the benefit of all parties involved (Hufbauer, 2015).

2.3 Definitions
Regulatory Chilling
The Regulatory Chilling Effect (RCE) refers to an instance in which the threat of
a potential ISDS dispute influences an actual decision on policy creation, often thereby
deterring policy creation for fear of reprisal. This is seen in the cancellation, or great
depreciation of, any government policy intended for the public interest or good. Eric
Neumayer, of the London School of Economics and Political Science, has described the
phenomenon in terms of environmental policy as a situation in which a developing
country either lowers environmental standards or fails to raise them for fear that
internationally mobile capital might move to countries with lower standards (2001). Also
worth mentioning, are international trade and environment scholars Kevin Grey and
Duncan Brack, who outline in an OECD report RCE as when, “countries refrain from
enacting stricter environmental standards in response to fears of losing a competitive
edge” (2002).
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Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS)
ISDS is an avenue for external judicial arbitration designed exclusively for use by
foreign investors, enabling them to bring legal suits against foreign governments on the
basis of FTAs and BITs signed by the relevant parties and which have legally prescribed
'fair and equitable treatment' practices. They also enable compensation to investors for
'indirect expropriation,' pertaining often to losses of potential revenues as well as tangible
losses (Ankersmit & Hill, 2015). ISDS decisions are considered final, not based on
precedent and are currently not open to any type of appeals process (Joubin-Bret, 2015).
Though ISDS is invoked often as a catch-all term for a variety of dispute settlement
clauses, there are differences in its application depending on the international institution
administering its process and the specific treaty through which it is being activated. The
basic conceptual purpose and effects are largely congruent; ISDS exists in its most simple
form as an investor’s tool for which to utilize a pre-arranged and contractual third-party
judicial option. This option is separate from any localized system and may be chosen for
reasons of protecting property and guaranteeing impartiality. The United States
government describes its own attitudes concerning ISDS by stating, “[ISDS] provides a
neutral international forum to resolve investment disputes under international law [and]
mitigates conflicts and protects [our] citizens” (USTR, 2015).
Gary Hufbauer, who served as the deputy assistant secretary of international trade
and investment policy for the US Treasury from 1977-1979 and is currently a nonresident
senior fellow with the Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE), has
frequently voiced support for this kind of mechanism. In offering reasons for ISDS,
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Hufbauer has articulated what he views as the three basic provisions which ISDS clauses
in general seek to protect. These provisions are:
1. “A country should not expropriate the property of a foreign investor without
paying compensation; and it shouldn’t expropriate it except for a public purpose, in other
words, you’re not supposed to take away property and give it to a private owner”
(Hufbauer, 2015).
2. “Foreign investors who come to a country should get the same treatment as
local firms investing in that country, that’s called national treatment” (2015).
3. “There’s kind of a catch-all provision, saying that governments should give
foreign investors fair and equitable treatment. That language [as I said] has been used
thousands of times” (2015).
This interpretation of ISDS is largely mirrored by the US government. The World
Bank’s ICSID, where ISDS cases are most frequently arbitrated, is itself a major post
WWII institution. The design of these institutions, to solidify U.S.’s economic systems
globally, has been the provision of both the World Bank and the IMF. 3 In the United
States, FTAs and BITs include ISDS mechanisms specifically designed to protect
investors in foreign countries with the following four basic protections from foreign
governments, according to the Office of the U.S Trade Representative.
1. ‘Freedom from discrimination: An assurance that Americans doing business
abroad will face a level playing field and will not be treated less favorably than local
investors or competitors from third countries’ (USTR, 2015).

Departments and purposes further explained by World Bank at
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/ICSID%20And%20The%20World%20Bank%20Group.aspx
3
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2. ‘Protection against uncompensated expropriation of property: An assurance
that the property of investors will not be seized by the government without the payment
of just compensation’ (2015).
3. ‘Protection against denial of justice: An assurance that investors will not be
denied justice in criminal, civil, or administrative adjudicatory proceedings’ (2015).
4. ‘Right to transfer capital: An assurance that investors will be able to move
capital relating to their investments freely, subject to safeguards to provide governments
flexibility, including to respond to financial crises and to ensure the integrity and stability
of the financial system’ (2015).
Of considerable note in evaluating what ISDS is and how it functions globally, is
evaluating its role in what can be seen as the removal of the investor’s home-state
apparatus from investor-disputes all together. As noted, states from which investors have
won sizable awards through ISDS arbitration, are not always willing to abide by specific
rulings. In these instances, an investor’s home state can be called upon to assist, in one
fashion or another, often using diplomatic or economic coercive techniques (Posner,
2016).
Ted Posner, a lawyer who was part of the trade counsel for the U.S. Senate
Finance Committee from 2001-2002, and is currently a partner with the International
Trade Group and the International Dispute Resolution Group, described how the removal
of the state from these disputes may have been intended, but is not entirely the current
reality. In a paper concerning the potential addition of appellate mechanisms for ISDS,
Posner explains how with ISDS, “it is not a part of an institution that is essentially
diplomatic and negotiation-oriented in character. Quite the contrary. When a host Party
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consents to allow an investor of another party, rather than the other party itself, to
vindicate rights under the agreement it is consenting to removal of the dispute from the
realm of diplomacy” (Posner, 2016).
In a conference presented at the Wilson Center, Posner contributed to a panel
examining practicalities and suggestions for reform in the current system of ISDS. In this
talk, Posner first examined the traditional story ISDS presents, which is that it’s the
solution to the diplomatic entanglements that the home state of investors wished
originally to remove itself from. Often, firms could entangle their governments in foreign
investment battles that they wished not to fight. Posner explains however, how this
transition was never fully realized- and how it potentially never will. Posner sees the role
of the investor’s home state as encompassing three different roles throughout the entire
arbitration process. He describes these roles as ‘enforcer, gatekeeper and alternative
claimant’ (2016). The role of enforcer, he says, is simply the state’s role in “helping the
investor to enforce its award in the event that there is an arbitral award in favor of the
investor” (2016). Second, Posner describes the state as gatekeeper, which is to say that
the state operates essentially the final say in trade negotiations anyway. Third, the state as
an alternative claimant examines, “state to state dispute settlement, ala the WTO, [which]
may be preferable to resolving a dispute [as opposed] to investor-to-state dispute
settlement” (2016).
Cases of this nature often include and lead with Argentina- a source of wellknown cases where US investors in particular found final resolution of payment through
actions taken by their U.S. home state. To aid the investors in the collection of their
settlement, the U.S. used its economic leverage and pulled Argentina off a preferred
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trading list, ultimately coercing Argentina into a final payment it otherwise had sought to
avoid (Zivkovic, 2016).
Global cases brought forward vary in terms of their industry, but of particular note
is that “at least one in three cases at ICSID is related to oil, mining or gas” (Van der Pas
& Damanik, 2014). The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD), reported in 2013 that 70% of claims had originated from the services sector.
These included the supply of gas and electricity, construction, banking and retail trade. In
2014 UNCTAD reported that 61% of its new cases were in service, 28% in industry and
11% based on investments within manufacturing (2014).

2.4 History and Trends
First Appearances & Current Trends
Investors have long sought property rights protection abroad, fearing foreign
courts would not provide the necessary impartiality required to deliver fair justice or
compensation following acts of expropriation. Evidence of this has been suggested as far
back as 800 years, beginning with the Magna Carta (USTR, 2015). Another historical
example is the US ‘American Jay Treaty,’ established by the first US Chief Justice, who
ensured that “investors received ‘full compensation for [their] losses and damages’ where
those could not be obtained ‘in the ordinary course of justice’ 4 (USTR, 2015). Even in
those times, states such as the US sought to assure foreign investors of their property

4Many

thoughts on ISDS from direct U.S. Gov. opinion located on this detailed site exploring FTAs and
BITs. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2015/march/investor-state-disputesettlement-isds
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rights in order to assure their continued capital inflows. Post revolution, the US and other
countries experimented with over a 100 different types of investor-state arbitration
methods. Of great concern during this early process was how to deal with Mexico, where
everything from cattle theft to denials of general justice had become contentious on both
sides (USTR, 2015). More modern legal forms resembling the ISDS mechanisms of
today, first occurred sometime around the year 1960. A suggested premier case is
between Germany and Pakistan in 1959 (Economist, 2014). Other early examples include
Switzerland in ‘61, the Netherlands in ‘63, Italy in ‘64 and Sweden in ‘65 (SCC, 2016).
Today, EU member states account for nearly half of the roughly 3,000 total known cases
(European Commission, 2017).
State-to-state interaction had previously dominated the investor-to-state process,
with diplomatic channels handling the processes and helping to mediate the outcomes
(Posner, 2016). One reason that the number of cases has increased so markedly, may be
due to the fact that now investors can use the ISDS clause to directly challenge a state,
without the requirement of any state involvement. There has recently been a drastic
increase in the number of cases globally, since sometime during the early 1990’s (see
graph). In 2011 there was 56 cases, 59 cases in 2012 and then 70 cases in 2015 5. ISDS
cases globally have increased “from 38 cases in 1996 to 514 known cases (registered at
ICSID) in 2012” alone (Economist, 2014). 6

2015 projection: https://www.law360.com/articles/804975/un-says-investor-state-dispute-settlementcases- growing
6https://www.tni.org/en/briefing/netherlands-indonesia-bit-rolls-back-implementation-new-indonesianmining-law
5
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2.5 Facility Details
Since ISDS arbitration is largely held through the World Bank’s ICSID, many of
the proceedings are subsequently held at their main office headquarters located in
Washington D.C. States and investors may choose to hold proceedings elsewhere, 7
although do so with less regularity. Other venues include the International Centre for
Dispute Resolution (CDR), London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA),
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) or the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL).

2.6 Origin of Necessity
Local Courts & Concerns of Impartiality
ISDS is primarily a response to investors' fear of local courts' expected
impartiality or inability to deliver adequate judgements. Reasons vary, but most investors
discuss a lack of ‘maturity’ in the legal structure and doubt openly that impartiality will
be rendered fairly during arbitration (Wellhausen, 2016). According to the U.S.
government, “while countries with weak legal institutions are frequent respondents in
ISDS cases, American investors have also faced cases of bias or insufficient legal
remedies in countries with well-developed legal institutions.” It continues by saying,
“ISDS can be of particular benefit to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which
often lack the resources or expertise to navigate foreign legal systems and seek redress
for injury at the hands of a foreign government. Indeed, SMEs and individuals have

7

Other locations provided: http://internationalarbitrationlaw.com
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accounted for about half of all cases brought under international arbitration” (USTR,
2015).
In terms of why ISDS is included within FTAs and BITs between developed
countries, whose legal systems are not in question, the answer may be more geopolitical.
ISDS and the general structure of investment dispute settlement is an attempt at
maintaining a status quo for western economic leadership, while ISDS is seen often
specifically as a means of solidifying this legalist structure. It can often be seen as a kind
of template for all future world trade, with specific thought to establish legal precedents
written by western lawmakers before China takes full leadership and control of this arena
(World Trade Law, 2016).

2.7 Process, Costs and Outcomes
Enforcement
Apart from directly appealing to their home governments for assistance, investors
typically have limited options when it comes to collecting funds or recouping assets if
host states refuse to comply with settlement awards. If acceptance of results is not
adhered to, penalties such as fines or other means of coercion are utilized until parties
may eventually comply. Currently there have been few recorded instances of states
refusing to adhere to ISDS judgements, and while states have occasionally resisted the
payments of awards to investors, the threat of losing future investment often encourages
compliance. When nonpayment of awards does occur, investors can attempt to claim or
freeze a respondent country’s assets. International banking institutions will in some
instances then assist with this freezing of assets. If necessary, investors can then turn to
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home governments and request that the “right of diplomatic protection [be] reactivated,”
and thus “the home state of the investor can use all legitimate public international law
tools to force the host state to 'pay up’” (Zivkovic, 2015). A well-known example of this
occurring was Argentina’s refusal to pay awarded damages to US investors, and its
subsequent removal from the U.S. list of preferred trading partners. This loss of
preferential trading status resulted in massive losses in investments, which contributed to
Argentina’s eventual compliance and payment of the awards in question (Zivkovic,
2015).
Cost Associated with Proceedings
In terms of how expensive an ISDS case can be, settlements themselves have
climbed from the millions into billions (USD) as of recently. Arbitration alone, without
the inclusion of a settlement award, can be costly. According to the World Bank,
“depending on the complexity of the case as well as the number of pleadings and oral
hearings, costs could be substantial” (ICSID, 2017). Research by the OECD states the
average legal cost for arbitration to be $8 million (USD) on behalf of the claimant
(Gaukrodger & Gordon 2012). The main costs associated with arbitration when using
ICSID are broken down into the following three parts.
I.

Parties’ Legal Fees and Expenses

According to the World Bank, “a tribunal or ad hoc committee has discretion to
order” that legal fees can be reimbursed by the winning party. These legal fees will vary
depending on the counsel chosen by either party but can be substantial due also to the
length of average ICSID cases, which can last on average 3.6 years (ICSID, 2017).
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II.

Advance Payments to ICSID

The cost of the tribunals at ICSID vary, but there are some standard costs
associated with arbitration. According to ICSID, an “advance payment of $100,000.00
(USD) – $150,000.00 (US) per party for the purpose of establishing” a tribunal is
required. Some of the included particulars of this overall fee are as follows:
● A fee of $3,000.00 (USD) per day for meetings or other work performed in
connection with the proceedings, corresponding to $375.00 (USD)/hour (ICSID,
2017).
● The center does not charge the parties for its services by the hour but charges an
annual fee, currently $32,000.00 (USD). The fee covers time spent by all
members of the dedicated case team, including the assistance of the Secretary at
hearings and the financial management of the case account. This fee is usually
divided equally between the parties (2017).
III. Lodging Fee
If a party requests either the “institution of conciliation, arbitration or fact-finding
proceedings under the ICSID Convention or the Additional Facility,” or requests an
annulment of a previous award which has been rendered, a non-refundable fee of $25,000
(USD) will be charged. If a party requests a “supplementary decision to or rectification of
an award under the Convention,” or requests the “interpretation or revision of an award
under the Convention, requests the “re-submission of a dispute to a new Tribunal after
the annulment of an award under the Convention,” or requests the “supplementary
decision to, or the correction or interpretation of, an award under the Additional Facility
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Rules (Administrative and Financial Regulation 16, Schedule of Fees),” then a nonrefundable fee of $10,000 (USD) will be charged (2017).

Awards and Totals
Of total costs associated with arbitration, 82% is accumulated solely by the cost of
counsel and experts by each side. The arbitrator fees total an average of 16%, while
institutional costs payable to the organizations that administer arbitration generally
amount to about 2% (European Commission, 2015). These figures help to appreciate the
ways in which costs of arbitration might average such a high figure.
Not to be excluded from the cost of arbitration, are the actual amounts awarded.
Average ISDS claims run $622.6 million (USD), while the average award is $16.6
million (USD) (Franck, 2011). This number reflects the actual amount transferred by
governments, but because of transparency complications this amount may not entirely
account for all total expenditures.
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Chapter Three – Literature Review
3.1 Literature Review Introduction
This literature review section covers the principal objections and support for ISDS
within the framework of international investment, covering both clearly visible concerns
as well as the more nuanced disagreements. The main thrust of this review will focus on
ISDS arbitration and the debates regarding the influence of economic power dynamics on
case outcomes. As concerns over RCEs and the wider threat to an established legalism
by economic power imbalances cause disturbances in confidence for international
investment, the debate about whether these concerns can be alleviated through further
legalism has become wide ranging. This debate therefore encourages or discourages
actual investment for both parties, as uncertainty around the viability of international
administering bodies disrupts the faith necessary to facilitate what is often substantial
investment.
The central question being asked in this paper, is not whether ISDS can provide
security for foreign investment, it most certainly does, but whether or not it can maintain
the international confidence in administrative outcomes necessary to satisfy parties who
utilize it for securing investment in the first place. If faith in its ability to render
judgements impartial to political influences becomes suspect, then its use will begin to
erode. Relevant to the point of whether or not ISDS will remain a feature of international
investment moving forward, this again is important due to current US domestic concerns
regarding states’ sovereign right to regulate. As mentioned, there were significant
criticisms and concerns regarding California’s potential to lose regulatory freedom during
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TPP trade negotiations, which ultimately contributed to that negotiation’s failure. This
concern, real or imagined, and the associated mistrust of ISDS were a large part of
voter’s reluctance with TPP. These and other concerns ultimately helped lead to the
postponing and eventual abandonment of the trade negotiation altogether by the US,
despite what would have potentially been a massive economic boost to that US state.
It is with this in mind, that the main disagreement to be reviewed here is whether
or not power imbalances are reflected in ISDS outcomes between host nations and their
foreign investors.

3.2 Origin and Purpose
There currently exists a robust debate concerning the judicial fairness rendered by
third party tribunal disputes, arising from international trade and investment agreements
that specifically allow for such a mechanism of arbitration. The notion of ISDS, it’s
potential necessity in agreements and the manner in which it is exercised- are all
components of dynamic global discussion. Since the close of the Second World War, the
intertwining of supply chains and investment has been sought as a way to bind and stitch
nations together. Along with this, powerful institutions have been structured and agreed
upon in order to create a framework of cooperation that could be sustained. Recently,
ISDS has become a ‘red herring’ in this process (Dickson-Smith & Mercurio, 2018). The
scholarly research aside, there is an overwhelming popular assumption today that ISDS is
a tool for abuse by the corporate wealthy; a tool for big business to extract monumental
amounts of money from otherwise sovereign but economically weak, or vulnerable states
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(Schultz & Dupont, 2014). What’s more, there have been a number of landmark case
examples in which these sentiments appear to have rung true (Franck, 2009).
Highly publicized trade negotiations such as those of the TPP or the TTIP have
only furthered public interest and attention to the ISDS topic. Where debate has grown,
fears and negative sentiments have followed suit. Whether it be concerns from the
Belgian region of Wallonia during CETA negotiations, or California’s fear over
regulatory freedoms during TPP trade talks, fears over States’ rights and poor nations
welfare have been called into question. Whether or not the system of arbitration can
perform in a way that reflects meaningful outcomes of fairness and justice, will dictate
much of the overall system’s survival. Indeed, TTIP and TPP are now on indefinite hold;
two agreements that would have had otherwise enormous geopolitical effects. If global
markets cannot secure a governing structure that maintains legal confidence for the
world’s participants, then participation will decline. The relevance of whether or not
ISDS continues to be workable in international agreements speaks to the relevance of
whether or not economic global governance can survive. ISDS is not the lynchpin to
world order, but if it does not succeed in delivering perceptions of fair outcomes to
signatory States who have agreed to relinquish measures of sovereignty, then those states
can be expected to take their sovereignty back.

3.3 The Legality of Private Right of Action
Scholarly literature on the subject of ISDS is broad, covering many disciplines
and lines of debate. The initial dissection of the topic discusses the legitimacy of
providing a ‘private right of action’ to foreign actors in the first place. Before ISDS
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appeared in the late 1960’s, investors' main avenue for seeking redress remained in the
realm of diplomatic requests (Echandi, 2019). The private right of action development
served to give investors an alternative to State-to State diplomacy dependent resolutions
(2019). Scholars and policy experts who support the process ISDS provides, often point
to its necessity in facilitating the environment to attract investment and encourage trade.
Without a mechanism such as ISDS, those nations seeking foreign investment would
have an even more difficult time attracting it (Echandi, 2019; Oldenski, 2015; Erixon
2014; Fleming, 2014). The benefit to investors of providing a mechanism within
contracts to facilitate a third-party tribunal is clear. The more important question being, is
it legal? Directly challenging this notion is the historical doctrine on foreign action,
specifically the Drago and Calvo 8 doctrines to name two. This debate on the legality of
ISDS, provides a groundwork for discussing the current legitimacy crisis that
international law- and ISDS specifically, now face (Franck, 2011).
The second mainstream of discussion flows from an initial assumption that
private right of actions taken by foreign investors upon their host states can be legal, and
thus focuses instead on how to best facilitate these proceedings in a way that delivers the
intended goals of the signatories. There has been a great deal of dialog between scholars
and policy makers on this subject, with some major improvements being suggested as a
result of numerous complaints by both investors and host states. Culminating from this
debate, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) in

8Further

information regarding Calvo Doctrine, Calvo Clause and the Drago Doctrine can be found by
visiting Oxford Public International Law,
https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e689.
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2017 presented results from a working group on the topic which outlined reforms
discussing appellate mechanisms and arbitrator choice processes that would limit
potential conflicts of interest (UNCITRAL, 2017). The effort not to abandon private right
of action, but instead to improve its performance for the interested parties, has even led to
the discussion of establishing an international investment court within the European
Union. Indeed, as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) proved to be
precursor to the WTO, ISDS may prove to be a precursor to an investment based
permanent court system- one complete with permanent judges and a clear appellate
mechanism (Echandi, 2019; Van Harten, 2007).
Given the focus of this inquiry, the remaining section of the literature review will
evaluate the scholarly discourse not around the legality of private right of action, but on
the topic of how efficiently ISDS has performed in providing the outcomes its inclusion
within agreements had intended.

3.4 The Debate on How, Not If, to Operate Private Rights of Action
The ISDS process can, as described further in the previous section, be undertaken
within various international frameworks. Most common among the choices of
administration, has been ICSID. By volume, ICSID facilitated over half of all ISDS
proceedings, at 55% (Echandi, 2019). ICSID is currently deemed the only institutional
arbitration available, all others technically exist as ad hoc, due to the 1965 ICSID
convention (2019). Various rules can be utilized by those in arbitration, not only ICSID’s
institution rules. Even in cases where the ICSID facilities are utilized, some 6% of
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participants choose to use another set of guidelines, despite the use of procedural ICSID
space (2019).
The second most commonly used rules for arbitration proceedings has been
UNCITRAL, at 31%, and 15% within others such as the International Chamber of
Commerce (ICC) or the SCC (Echandi, 2019). Given the landscape of tribunals used,
much of the current and past debate has revolved around how ISDS is adjudicated under
both ICSID and UNCITRAL.
This is an important reality to keep in mind when discussing the debate around
ISDS results, because much of the discussion concerns the outcomes of proceedings that
are specific to the process of largely two specific venues. It is also a crucial point to be
made when debate unfolds concerning the changing of specific rules to improve the
outcomes from ISDS. ISDS in this context is not seen as the problem, instead the
problem is how it is implemented. This literature review will not spend an inordinate
amount of time discussing and reviewing the various rule changes and their
corresponding debates, but rather seek to summarize the discussion concerning the
impact of rules and language.

3.5 ISDS Goes Public, in a Very Negative Way
Detractors of ISDS have suggested that it is a tool by which international
companies and investors have leveraged their outsized economic power to extract wealth
and prevent regulatory measures that might otherwise protect national interests. In this
regard, ISDS has been called little better than economic imperialism by a different name
(Sornarajah, 2016; Kaushal, 2009). In an article published by The European Journal of
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International Law, this sentiment has been acknowledged- questioning the empowerment
of investors utilizing ISDS (Schultz & Dupont, 2014). The near meteoric rise in the
number of cases over the last two decades has likewise alarmed many, with the
assumption being that the increase of cases is indicative of a growing abuse of power by
the Global North against the developing world (2014). As sweeping trade agreements
have been proposed, select cases of abuse have been used to augment the perceived
dangers.
In 2016 Times reporter Haley Sweetwater Edwards published her book entitled,
Shadow Courts: The Tribunals That Rule Global Trade. The title of her book conveys
much of the fear the general public now regards ISDS with. Her writing reflects a
growing view that the tribunals provided for by ISDS clauses, have been used
overwhelmingly by multinational corporations to exploit the wealth of sovereign nations
and their citizens.
Similar sentiments have likewise appeared in the Economist as well, expressing
concern both over a dramatic rise in the number of cases and the impact it has potentially
had on domestic regulatory action. In 2014, the Economist published a piece on ISDS
which characterized it as an instrument by which multinational corporations run
roughshod over ‘ordinary people’ and state regulation, trampling protections on health
and the environment.
While these and other journalistic publications and commentary have provoked
concern from the public, the international law and investment community has also been
intensely debating the subject. Dr. Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah of the National
University of Singapore has written critically about the use of legal interpretations during
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arbitrations, suggesting that in some cases they do not reflect the original intent of the
treaties previously agreed upon. Further, Sornarajah has asserted that the original intent
of the investment protections- to deliver development, has failed. In place of promised
development, he argues absolute protections to investors have been the primary outcome
(Sornarajah, 2016). A much-cited author on the subject, Sornarajah’s criticisms have
made a lasting impression on the debate.
New York University law professor Vicki Been echoes a growing chorus of ISDS
criticism challenging the broad nature of expropriation interpretations, a point of
contention that has caused much of the recent controversy (Been & Beauvais, 2003).
Substantial concern has been expressed by international law scholars about the losses
brought to arbitration regarding ‘potential’ profits having been lost due to specifically
regulatory measures taken by host states.
Indeed, it is here that two concerns have been shown to hold merit. First, some of
the awards that have come down as a result of successfully arbitrated complaints
involving the loss of potential profits due to host state enactment of regulation have been
alarming. In the 1997 case of Metalclad Corp v. United Mexican States (under NAFTA),
an ICSID ruling awarded the US investor $17.7 million (USD) in damages. Pertinent to
note within this debate, was that the original claim by the investor was for $90 million
(USD). The case, predicated on the alleged interference of local Mexican regulatory
action, has served as a powerful example of how corporations can demand ‘regulatory
takings’ and potentially dictate regulatory action by otherwise sovereign states.
Another example often held up as proof that ISDS is an investment tool of abuse,
is the 2015 case between host state Ecuador and the Houston based oil company
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Occidental. Due to cancelled contracts for drilling in the Amazon, an arbitration court
awarded Occidental over $1.7 billion (USD). This amounted to an award costing nearly
2% of Ecuador’s GDP at the time, not including the costs associated with arbitration
itself. These and a few other large cases won by investing claimants have served to inflate
the average awards and cost of legal expenses (Echandi, 2019), further bolstering the
detractor’s arguments that ISDS has been an abusive and unjust tool of foreign
investment.

3.6 Empirical Studies Begin to Challenge Negative Perceptions
Although there have clearly been cases that question any observer’s view on the
impartiality of ISDS outcomes, these cases have also served to distort a complicated
fabric of cases that has changed and evolved both in time and place. As complaints and
concerns about the outcomes ISDS has rendered, especially given the enormous increase
in cases over the last couple decades, a great number of studies have been conducted to
further understand the evolving nature of ISDS.
Within the body of this work, five key insights take shape to provide a more
objective view of ISDS. These five insights work to explain within the confines of
ISDS’s legal ability how it can and cannot provide fair outcomes to those who
incorporate it into agreements. These are first, that ISDS has had a history of being
decided more in favor of investors than States, but that these outcomes have since
evolved. Second, ISDS is no longer solely a tool of wealthy nations over poorer ones.
Third, ISDS is no longer a tool used only by large corporations from wealthy States but is
increasingly being invoked both by smaller businesses and by businesses from less

33

wealthy nations. Fourth, ISDS is shaped today not only by its ability to entice Foreign
Direct Investment (FDI) to developing nations, but increasingly is now also a mechanism
being used to shape and refine agreements between middle and upper-income countries.
Fifth, ISDS is serving in ways both positive and negative to enforce norms and align
political economies in today's global investment and trading networks. As a result of this,
ISDS will almost surely be altered to accommodate a diverse body of actors and take its
place as a key inclusionary part within global governance.

Insight One
To address the first insight, ISDS introductory had warranted the charges of
mistreatment by investing States against the host States. This reality is largely
acknowledged by all serious commentators on both sides of the debate (Franck, 2007;
Schulz & Dupont, 2015; Sornarajah, 2016; Korzun, 2017; Echandi, 2019). As the
timeline of ISDS has progressed however, the debate has taken on a more empirical
aspect which paints a different picture. The United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD) provides information on all publicly known treaty based ISDS
cases to date.9 These cases span all known ISDS disputes, which include the great
quantity that proceeded under the procedural rules and processes of both ICSID and
UNCITRAL, as well as all other available known options such as the SCC or ICC. This
data reflects a changing dynamic of cases decided in favor of States vs. investors, but
clearly begins with decisions in favor of the investor being more numerous than in favor

9Further

details available by visiting https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-dispute-settlement

34

of states. There is also a clear spike in the number of cases that were settled in 2003 and
2004- which derives specifically from both the Argentine financial crisis of 2003-04 (Di
Rosa, 2004) and the collapse of investment returns from the Indian Dabhol Power Project
(in the state of Maharashtra). The collapse of investments tied to the Dabhol Power
Project were largely due to fallout from the corruption case involving US firm Enron,
whose failure culminated around the winter of 2001 (Sornarajah, 2016; UNCTAD, 2019).
These two major increases in settlements, along with the clear lack of decisions made in
favor of the State up until that point, can be seen illustrated in Fig. 3-A.
Figure 3-A Outcome of ISDS Cases 1986-2018

The questionable justice in the outcomes of these and older cases, provide an
understandable hesitation to view ISDS in current terms as a mechanism capable of
delivering justice to participants other than wealthy investors (Schulz & Dupont, 2014;
Sornarajah, 2016). Examples of these abuses, as well as counter examples, are offered in
more depth within the qualitative section.
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Insight Two
In addressing the second key finding empirical studies have contributed to the
debate, ISDS is no longer a tool used solely by wealthy nations against poorer ones. Fig.
3-B illustrates this change, depicting only decisions rendered in favor of states and
investors. There is a clear change in the trend post 2005, after which a full decade passes
before cases in favor of investors again overtake that of the States.
Figure 3-B Outcome of ISDS Cases 1986-2018

UNCTAD data reflects that overall, since the first ISDS case to the most recent,
decisions have been made in favor of the States 35.5% of the time, compared to 29.5%
for investors (UNCTAD, 2019).
Complicating this picture, is the amount that damage awards are decided. Finding
a workable average has proved both difficult and misleading. Often awards are small, but
when they are large- they are gargantuan. Research indicates that on average, of the
awarded compensations to date, half of the awards granted were for less than $16 million
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(Wellhausen, 2016). When awards were granted, reports indicate that the amount granted
was often below 30% of the original amount requested by the investor (Puig &
Strezhnev, 2017; Franck, 2007). This stands in contrast to an often-cited mean of $508
million (USD). This mean is influenced strongly by five specific cases which resulted in
awards in excess of $5 billion (USD). Their inclusion of course pulls the average higher,
but is not always clearly identified (Echandi, 2019).

Insight Three
In conjunction with the perception that ISDS is a tool solely used by wealthier
nations, is the accompanying assumption that it is used solely by large corporations or
multinational enterprises (MNE) (Schultz & Dupont 2014; Sornarajah, 2010). This
makeup of investors does not match however with the findings by the OECD in 2013, or
in other studies examining the composition of investors who invoke ISDS (Miller &
Hicks, 2015). The OECD has found that a third of cases submitted originated from small
businesses, about half were submitted from medium up to large businesses, and less than
a tenth from MNEs (Gaukrodger & Gordon, 2012; Echandi, 2019).
This composition is further underscored by research identifying 50% of all U.S.
ISDS claimants as being made up of small to medium businesses, designated as having
fewer than 500 employees (Miller & Hicks 2015; Franck, 2011). MNEs clearly still
represent the greatest portion of the claimants, but the overall distribution reveals more
diversity in incomes and business size than popular perceptions suggest.
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Insight Four
Additionally, UNCTAD data reflects over 20 ISDS cases have originated from
investors in developing nations themselves. Examples of this include such countries as
Ukraine, Jordan and Egypt, while another 30 cases have originated from investors in
upper-middle income nations (Echandi, 2019).
This perception of powerful investors invoking ISDS in abusive ways upon
developing nations, is also qualified further by recent surges in ISDS provisions having
been invoked between wealthier nations. ISDS is rapidly becoming a story between
wealthier nations, and less a tool used between nations with wide economic disparities
(Echandi, 2019).

Insight Five
Finally, ISDS is serving in ways both positive and negative to enforce norms and
align political economies in today's global investment and trading networks. As a result
of this, ISDS will almost surely be altered to accommodate a diverse body of actors and
take its place as a key inclusionary part within global governance.
If the confidence in international institutions to deliver judgements which are
impartial to non-legal influences falters, then their durability and influence of these
institutions will most certainly begin to wane. Among the calls to improve international
economic governing institutions such as ICSID, upgrades designed to increase faith and
participation have included calls to install permanent adjudicators, increase transparency
and create appellate mechanisms. The improved drafting of IIAs has also been discussed,
so as to level a playing field for all participants. Already, as the UNCTAD IIA Mapping
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Project has stated, treaties are increasingly borrowing from each other's success in
formats, leading to more agreeable contracts to both States and investors (2020).
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Chapter Four - Quantitative Analysis
4.1 Quantitative Analysis Introduction
Empirical evidence analyzing the record of ISDS cases available have provided
new quantitative insights to the discussions around regulatory effects and ISDS. Work
done by Christine Côté and others has offered evidence to support the theory that
economic disparity does indeed play some role in adjudicated outcomes (Côté, 2014).
Gary Hufbauer and proponents of ISDS’s impartiality, in terms of fairness of treatment
and arbitration outcomes, suggest that previous inadequacies identified by those such as
Côté stem from insufficient contractual design protections needed to prevent exploitation
(Hufbauer, 2015). These contractual design protections have been specifically identified
by Hufbauer as contractual clauses known as savings provisions (2015, 2019). According
to Hufbauer’s assessment, the current record of case outcomes reflects this change, seen
by a decline in arbitration decided in favor of investors over host states (2015, 2019).
While there is evidence of this when looking along temporal lines (seen in literature
review), the ability to quantify cases using the near comprehensive coded data provided
by the UNCTAD IIA Mapping Project now offers a powerfully testable component to
this debate.
The IIA Mapping Project, a collaborative initiative begun between UNCTAD and
universities from around the world, has recently completed a nearly comprehensive
coding of the legal content IIA treaties for more than 2,500 of the approximately 3,000
IIAs in current existence. The result provides policymakers, researchers and investors
with a source of information on the specific design of contracts to be used for identifying
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trends and patterns in policy, treaty drafting and outcomes. Many IIAs are broadly
comparable due to similar structures, but frequently address country-specific issues in
slightly varying ways, offering insightful differences in outcomes given what are often
minor alterations in legal language. As UNCTAD states specifically of its mapping
project, “these differences have been critical to the outcomes of many international
investor-state arbitrations (UNCTAD, 2020).”
Public ISDS outcomes, which have been decided either in favor of states or
investors, as well as additional case information, is available through UNCTAD’s
Investment Policy division which supplies results from all the main administrational
venues. These include not only the UN, but also ICSID, which facilitates the majority of
arbitration. By specifically comparing the results from UNCTAD’s database with the IIA
Mapping Projects identification of language considered to reflect savings provisions, it is
possible to test for correlational evidence with regards to arbitration outcomes. If
Hufbauer and others are correct, and the inclusion of savings provisions measurably
affects the outcome of cases, then a correlation reflecting this can be found when
comparing the data available from these two resources.
The approach used to find correlational evidence of savings provisions here has
been broken into two quantitative sections. The first quantitative section examines
savings provision inclusion and its effects on ISDS arbitration as a whole. This section
also examines alternative explanatory variables, specifically those with regards to wealth
and wealth disparity. While the effects of wealth disparity are less suggestive and do not
return significant statistics, they do return predictive values which warrant further
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examination. This relationship is picked up and further examined in a second quantitative
section, which tests a model that interacts the variables of savings provisions and wealth
disparity (measured in the year of case initiation).

4.2 Quantitative Analysis - Section One
I.

Hypothesis
The first part of the quantitative analysis done here, focuses on the effect savings

provision inclusion has on the outcome of decided cases, and examines its predictability
in measures of confidence as they pertain to the case registry. Additionally, national
wealth and wealth disparity variables that may likewise act as predictors are explored,
most notably the disparity in wealth between host states and home states of investors in
the year disputes were first initiated (measured using GDP).
The following hypotheses are tested using the IIA Data Mapping Project’s coded
database, cross referenced with existing case records available through UNCTAD’s
Investment Dispute Settlement Navigator, to create an original selection of case data
specifically designed for the purposes of this inquiry. Section One’s hypothesis is defined
as follows.
H1: The inclusion of a savings provision will increase the likelihood of an ISDS
dispute being decided in favor of a state.

II.

Design
The design of the data set used here is the same as the design used in Quantitative

Analysis Part Two. The collection method, use of the UN and University IIA Mapping

42

Project Database is the same, as well as the method by which disparity between host
nations and investor’s home nations has been calculated.

Data Selection
The data set and design of this study investigated whether or not the discrepancy
in the GDP between a respondent state and plaintiff’s home state (x) affects successful
ISDS defense (y) among 2,443 cases that resulted in a clear decision of being either
decided in favor of a State or an Investor (n=323). The cases analyzed are from the
UNCTAD IIA Mapping Project’s database, which codes for 100 different elements which
identify coded legal approaches within each treaty. The project’s 2,557 treaties were
mapped by students of law from universities around the world, and their work was
completed with coordination and guidance by UNCTAD as well as professorial
supervision.
Worth noting in this selection, is the bias which results from examining only those
cases which were brought to arbitration and decided. First, is the bias of only including
cases brought to court. There are presumably a great many instances in which disputes
have been reconciled outside of formal arbitration, and therefore the influencing variables
that affected their outcomes is not included. Secondly, many cases of dispute have been
settled before an arbitration reaches a definitive conclusion in favor of the state or the
investor. By excluding cases of this kind, and especially those decided specifically ‘in
favor of neither party,’ the effects of influencing variables again go unexamined. An
example of this is further discussed in section 5.2, detailing the case of Newmont Mining
v. Indonesia. The reason for these exclusions is due to the difficulty of examining cases
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which were never begun. Secondly, owing to the fact that ISDS outcomes are only public
when both parties allow for transparency, there is further difficulty in defining outcomes
of cases which are sealed.
The selection bias described here does however present the finding given as a
hard test of both hypotheses. If savings provisions have an adverse effect on the
likelihood an investor will be successful in arbitration, then they are less likely to bring
disputes to trial. Likewise, if the settlement of a dispute is abandoned or settled before
arbitration is completed, the assumption would be that the contractual language was not
defensive enough to warrant seeing the process through. This implies therefore that the
sample bias skews the cases studied here in such a way, that only those cases which are
seen as potentially favorable to investors are being measured. Therefore, measuring the
variable effects of both savings provisions and GDP disparity on outcome are held to an
artificially high standard, and their effects should be weighed ultimately with this in
mind.
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable (y) used in this analysis describes a successful defense
against a plaintiff who has brought an ISDS dispute to any of the available forums, and in
which the outcome was decided as being in favor of the state or the investor not counted
in the data set used for this analysis, were any cases still pending or which resulted in
either a settled, discontinued, or otherwise undefined outcome. The choice to exclude
these alternative outcomes was made to maintain clarity of outcome, due to the opaque
nature of settled or discontinued outcomes- specifically when final agreements are not
required to be documented publicly and are therefore unavailable. As a result, there are
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cases in which an investor could be seen to have ‘won’ a discontinued or settled case, but
given the 323 cases with definitive outcomes, the choice was made to exclude those
outcomes.

Independent Variables / Control Variable
The first of two main independent variables analyzed in this study, is the disparity
in GDP between the respondent and plaintiff home States in the year in which the ISDS
dispute was initiated. The choice to measure the variable in this way was made for three
distinct reasons. First, the majority of countries' GDP figures have fluctuated greatly
between the years of first signing and currently available World Bank figures. For this
reason, the use of case initiation year proved the most appropriate in gauging a country’s
economic standing at the time it was in a process of defense. Additionally, this was true
for not only for respondent state GDP, but also for an investor’s home state. Secondly, in
seeking to identify a good reflective measure of power dynamics between a respondent
and plaintiff state, the disparity between GDP figures was chosen. Thirdly, scenarios in
which the plaintiff had a GDP less than the respondent, and therefore a negative disparity
result, were removed from final calculations in order to focus exclusively on effects
resulting from States being economically weaker during arbitration. Note however that
these negative figures are used in the second quantitative section to follow. This was
done with the intention to keep results focused on a power imbalance by which the
respondent state is reliant upon a combination of degree in GDP discrepancy as well as a
savings provision. These negative cases accounted for 72 of the total cases analyzed here.
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While not included in final statistical calculations, these negative figures and their
outcomes are presented in all following cross tabulations for reference.
The decision to bracket the GDP difference in the amounts chosen for tabulation
purposes was decided by selecting eight sections (a ninth for negative summations) that
placed the mean country GDP according to current 2018 World Bank figures just below
center. Roughly one eighth of the world’s countries hold GDP measures above this mean,
and therefore give representation on a distributional curve above that mean. States with
GDP values above this mean also are more represented in the amount of plaintiff home
States and make up a disproportionate amount of the BITs analyzed.

Second Independent Variable
Of the 2,557 treaties the IIA Mapping Project analyzed, 2,443 included
specifically an ISDS provision, making them appropriate for analysis. Of the 2,443
treaties, 2,299 did not include any mention of a savings provision in either the preamble
or ‘other’ clause locations. Savings provisions are here defined in the Preamble or other
clause location using IIA Mapping Project codified language:
Preamble savings provision definition:
“Reference to right to regulate (e.g. regulatory autonomy, policy space, flexibility
to introduce new regulations).”
Other Clause savings provision definition:
“Right to regulate (any mentioning in the text of this or similar concepts, except
preamble).”
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Of the 2,557 treaties that included an ISDS mechanism, 144 also included a
savings provision as described above in either a preamble, other location, or both.

Variable Abbreviations Used
Variables abbreviations presented in the results section of both sections one and
two may be found in Table A1.
Table A-1 Variable Abbreviations
Full Title of Variable Term

Abbreviation

Description

Savings Provision Included

SPIncl

Specific coding language from
the UNCTAD IIA Mapping
Project determining y/n of a
savings provision inclusion.
Found in ‘preamble’ of
agreement (yes=1, no=0):
‘Reference to right to regulate
(e.g. regulatory autonomy,
policy space, flexibility to
introduce new regulations).’
Or,
Found in ‘other clauses’ of
agreement (yes=1, no=0:
‘Right to regulate (any
mentioning in the text of this or
similar concepts, except
preamble).’

Plaintiff GDP (2018)

PGDP.18

Plaintiff’s (investor’s) home
State GDP in 2018

Respondent GDP (2018)

RGDP.18

Respondent host State GDP in
2018

GDP Disparity (2018)

PvRGDPdisp.18

Plaintiff’s home State GDP
minus Respondent host State
GDP in 2018

Year of Case Initiation

IY

The year in which case was first
initiated

Plaintiff GDP (Year of Case
Initiation)

PGDP.IY

Plaintiff’s (investor’s) home
State GDP in year in which case
was first initiated
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Respondent GDP (Year of Case
Initiation)

RGDP.IY

Respondent host State GDP in
year in which case was first
initiated

GDP Disparity (In Year of Case
Initiation)

PvRGDPdisp.IY

Plaintiff’s home State GDP
minus Respondent host State
GDP in year in which case was
first initiated

III.

Results and Discussion
Tables B2 and B3 present summary data and coefficients for the full range of

variables examined in the data set, along with prediction data when all are run in one
model (Model 1).

Model 1 - Review of All Variables
National wealth and wealth disparity returned statistically insignificant results; a
finding of interest due to a perceived intuitiveness of their influence. The only variable
returning statistically significant results here, was the savings provision. This finding
supports it having an effect, but the average marginal effect signifies a negative
relationship. This negative relationship runs counter to hypothesis H1. Contrary to
expectations, the presence of a savings provision reduced the likelihood of a case being
decided in favor of the state by nearly 21%.
As discussed earlier, this negative finding may suggest that the hypothesis tested
here is being run as a particularly ‘hard’ test. If the presence of a savings provision can be
expected to increase the difficulty for an investor when seeking damages, then only those
few cases including a savings provision which are deemed worthy of arbitration cost
regardless of the inclusion, will therefore be pursued and counted within the data set
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analyzed here. As discussed previously, due to the difficulty in measuring those cases
which were deemed too difficult to be pursued by the investor due to the presence of a
savings provision, these hard cases are all that remains to be measured. This would imply
that the inclusion of a savings provision reduces the likelihood of a successful defense by
the host state by 21%. While contrary to H1, the level of significance returned from
Model 1 warrants further examination of savings provisions due to the correlation
measure, even if negative.
One variable shown here to have near statistical significance is the year of
initiation. For the purposes of this study, this interaction is not explored in great depth,
because the focus is on savings provisions solely and their predictable influence on future
ISDS disputes. ISDS cases are already known to have begun to include savings
provisions in the 1990’s more frequently, and the relationship to outcomes has been
linked to the ensuing years of cases deciding in favor of states, as evidenced in the
literature review section. The question is not if the year is the influencing factor, but if the
savings provisions that were introduced in the 1990’s were in fact the influencing
variables. For this reason, they are left out of the models moving forward.
Table B-1 Model 1, All Variables
Coefficients:

Ave. Marginal
Effects (AME)

(Intercept)

Estimate

Standard Error

Z Value

Pr(>|z|)

-85.39333

57.96967

-1.473

0.1407

Savings
Provision
Included

-0.2096

-0.89185

0.40709

-2.191

0.0285
*

Plaintiff GDP
(2018)

-0.009622

-78.17947

79.26839

-0.986

0.3240
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Respondent
GDP (2018)

0.1162

78.17864

79.26829

0.986

0.3240

GDP Disparity
(2018)

0.009626

78.17947

79.26839

0.986

0.3240

Year of Case
Initiation

0.01006

0.04260

0.02887

1.476

0.1400

Plaintiff GDP
(Year of Case
Initiation)

-0.01782

-116.35136

115.45219

-1.008

0.3136

Respondent
GDP (Year of
Case Initiation)

0.1515

116.35248

115.45216

1.008

0.3136

GDP Disparity
(In Year of Case
Initiation)

0.01782

116.35139

115.45221

1.008

0.3136

Significance codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1

Table B-2 Model 1, Deviance Residuals
Min

1Q

Median

3Q

Max

-1.8551

-1.2059

0.9123

1.0601

1.6192

Misclassification Error

0.4365325

N

323

Prob > Chi²

P = 0.03612119

AIC

447.37

4.3 Quantitative Analysis - Section Two
The second part of the quantitative analysis done here, explores potential
interaction effects between the main variables of savings provision inclusion and wealth
disparity (in year of initiation). While only the inclusion of a savings provision returned a
statistically significant measure of predictability in Model 1, the literature regarding
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wealth disparity between host states and investors increasingly suggests an interaction
between the two (Sornarajah, 2010). This effect is particularly highlighted as ISDS
arbitration moves from a predominantly rich vs. poor phenomenon, to an occurrence
increasingly seen between middle- and upper-income nations (Schultz & Dupont 2014;
Gaukrodger & Gordon, 2012; Hufbauer, 2019).
The suggested implication is that while the level of wealth disparity may or may
not affect arbitration outcome directly, it’s size and presence will affect the level by
which savings provision inclusion will measurably act as a predictor. The assumed
relationship is that of a diminishing rate of return for wealth; increases in wealth disparity
will reduce the otherwise present impartiality of strict legalism, thereby increasing bias
created by allowing for the introduction of resources which can be brought unfairly to
bear by one side to the detriment of the other. This is in conjunction with the idea that
savings provisions can only help to defend a less wealthy nation so much, and that at
some point the benefits of increased disparity begin to plateau. As wealth disparity
diminishes and potential wealth bias is decreased, legalism will increase and predictable
power of including a savings provision will increase. This curvilinear relationship is
therefore anticipated to present itself particularly well in a model which interacts these
two variables.

I.

Hypothesis
These assertions presented here are investigated by examining the following

hypothesis.
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H2: As wealth disparity increases, it will negatively affect the impact that a
savings provision has on predicting the likelihood of an ISDS dispute being decided in
favor of a state.
II.

Design

Quantitative Methods Selection
The aim of this section seeks to investigate a potential interaction relationship
between wealth disparity and the inclusion of savings provisions.

Data Set Selection
The design of the data set used here is the same as the design used in Section One.
The collection method, use of the UN and University IIA Mapping Project Database is
the same, as well as the method by which disparity between host nations and investor’s
home nations was calculated.

III.

Results and Discussion
Tables C1 and C2 present summary data and coefficients from Model 2, which

interacts the variables of savings provisions inclusion and wealth disparity between
investors and host states in the year of ISDS case initiation.
Model 2 - Review of Interaction Term
The interaction between the two variables of savings provision inclusion and GDP
disparity in the year of case initiation does not return a statistically significant value for
prediction. While the prediction level is below significance levels, the measure still
warrants future refining of the model to investigate interaction. As mentioned in the first
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section’s results, the ‘hard test’ of cases performed may in fact undervalue the efficacy of
savings provision inclusion, and likewise underrepresent an interaction between both
variables in Model 2.
There is potential that a more significant interaction is taking place, but not is not
being illuminated by this study’s particular measurement approach. Cases which were
brought before arbitration but that included a savings provision, may drastically underrepresent the effect these clauses have on the decision-making process investors go
through when deliberating whether or not to advance arbitration. Again, the ‘hard test’
that this approach presents, may not reflect itself well in the case data but still present
prediction coefficients that are statistically significant or near significant despite their low
showings.
This nuance in case selection has the potential to exacerbate interaction effects
concerning wealth disparity as well. As suggested in the literature, national wealth is
expected to positively affect the decision to pursue arbitration by an investor. This
implies that middle- and low-income home states of investors do not as frequently pursue
arbitration when savings provisions are present. Therefore, returning significance levels
just outside the range necessary to reject the null hypothesis are not entirely unexpected.
When interpreting the interaction results of Model 2, two main takeaways are to
be considered. The first is that although the P-value found is not in the significant range,
it does still exist low enough to encourage more nuanced testing. An interaction is hinted
at, but Model 2 does not secure findings to accept the hypothesis at this time. Secondly,
the lack of significance found may likewise illustrate that proponents of ISDS’s legalism
have evidence to support their claim. If the measures found do indeed represent the
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interaction as it exists, then wealth disparity has little bearing on the outcome of
arbitration- even when seen interacting with savings provision inclusion. This implies
that Hufbauer and other proponents of ISDS’s impartiality may indeed be correct in
viewing the legalism of international arbitration as more impervious to wealth disparity
bias than detractors suggest.
Table C-1 Model 2, Interaction Terms
Coefficients:

Estimate

Std. Error

z value

Pr(>|z|)

(Intercept)

2.361e-01

1.191e-01

1.983

0.0474 *

PvRGDPdisp.IY

1.633e-05

2.709e-05

0.603

0.5467

SPIncl

-7.842e-01

3.836e-01

-2.044

0.0409 *

disparityXSPincl

4.321e-06

3.787e-05

0.114

0.9092

Significance codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1

Table C-2 Model 2, Deviance Residuals
Min

1Q

Median

3Q

Max

-1.391

-1.261

1.009

1.095

1.442

N

323

Null
deviance

445.84 on 322
degrees of
freedom

Residual
deviance

441.00 on 319
degrees of
freedom

AIC

449

(Dispersion parameter for binomial family taken to be 1)
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IV.

Future Quantitative Analysis
Future research should focus on creating designs that measure the decision-

making process by investors as it pertains to savings provisions, as opposed to solely
examining the outcomes of cases which have been arbitrated to a conclusion. Alternative
measures of national wealth should also be explored, as GDP may not capture the essence
of potential interaction relationships.
4.4 Final Quantitative Conclusion (Section One and Two)
There remain major complications in finding the most appropriate way to measure
the case data used here, given the dynamics of case pursuance by plaintiffs in the first
place. Many investment disputes are weighed carefully before initiation and found to be
inadvisable by council for many reasons- least of which may be the legalism established
and enshrined by ISDS. The following qualitative section reviews a select number of
cases which present elements of these reasons, providing tangible examples of why cases
are discontinued, settled or abandoned.
In reviewing Model 1, the findings which attribute a negative sign to the effect of
savings provision inclusion may be a result of their inverse relationship to successful
defense. This study asserts alternatively that the result reflects a particularly skewed data
set and advises further design of a model that may reveal the measure and predictability
of savings provisions upon the decision to pursue arbitration, not solely the outcomes of
those chosen to be arbitrated.
Related cross tabulation analysis is to be found in the appendix, which reflects
incentives for this assertion. Namely, the vast majority of cases brought to arbitration do
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not include a savings provision in either the preamble or ‘other’ clausal locations. The
cross tabulation reveals a drastic reduction in the amount of cases brought to a final
decision when savings provisions are introduced. Specifically, of all the cases analyzed
here, only one case was brought to a final decision which included a savings provision in
both the preamble and ‘other’ clausal locations. This finding alone speaks volumes in
itself but presents uniquely difficult measuring hurdles. If cases with savings provisions
are never arbitrated, then measurement of arbitrated outcomes will fail to capture their
efficacy.
In reviewing Model 2, an interaction between wealth disparity and savings
provisions was similarly non-definitive. While the values returned due suggest a weak
relationship, they are not significant enough to accept the hypothesis H2. Similar to
Model 1, the outcome may again be due largely to inadequate measurement of cases
which are influenced by variables explored here, but not revealed by concluded
arbitration case data. Simply put, too much may be occurring before disputes reach
conclusive settlement in favor of plaintiff or respondent.
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Chapter Five - Qualitative Analysis
5.1 Qualitative Analysis Introduction
The qualitative analysis section here is divided into two sections. The first section
identifies an ISDS case that meets three preset qualifications to be described and is then
examined along those lines. Its purpose is to introduce examples of the key factors
examined in this study, previously analyzed in the quantitative section. The second
section is for the purpose of examining the effect of regulatory chilling as a result of
potential ISDS consequences. To limit the scope of study, two cases are examined that
involve the US and Canada under 1992’s NAFTA. RCE is important to discuss here, as it
pertains to the confidence in legalism that savings provisions have the potential to
provide but is difficult to study given the nature of cases to not result in clearly defined
outcomes. Additionally, there are already case studies which offer evidence for the effect
(see Côté, 2014). The challenge is not to identify examples of abuse, as much as it is to
control for all other variables and explanations. Therefore, this second section is cursory,
focusing instead on two cases and the process of analyzing RCE generally.

5.2 Section One - Case Study: Newmont Mining v. Indonesia
Case Selection
The following case was selected for analysis on the grounds that it provided three
key points of study. First, the IIA was signed in an era characterized by the literature
review as a time demonstrating the most abuse. This case was also then adjudicated
recently in 2014 and therefore offers a strong juxtaposition between the years and their
potential influences. Second, issues regarding RCE and other abuses are evident. While
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the case is ultimately not decided clearly in favor of the plaintiff or respondent, the
outcome of ‘discontinued’ is publicly discussed by both parties and offers a unique
opportunity to review an outcome which is difficult to otherwise quantify. Lastly, this
case emphasizes the impact from treaties which contain no savings provisions. However,
the case also resulted in the drafting of a second BIT in 1994 after the first expired,
choosing to include a savings provision clause. This situation offered a further
opportunity to examine the effect of an RCE incident on a State’s future decision making.
Case Detail Overview
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●

Case Name: Nusa Tenggara v. Indonesia
Case Decision: Discontinued
Investment Treaty: Indonesia - Netherlands BIT (1994)
IIA Mapping Project ID: 1518
BIT Signed: 07/07/1968
BIT Entered Force: 17/07/1971
Year of Case Initiation: 2014
ISDS: Yes
Savings Provision in Preamble: No
Savings Provision in Other Clauses: No
Indonesia GDP in year of case initiation (2014): $890.8 billion (USD)
Netherlands GDP in year of case initiation (2014): $891 billion (USD)
GDP Disparity at time of case initiation (2014): $200 million (USD)

Case Review
The Yudhoyono government in Indonesia, in an attempt to increase control over
its own natural mineral wealth and at the same time increase domestic employment (in
both mining and processing), passed an industry regulation in 2009 that attempted to take
aim at a fix.10 This regulatory action by the Yudhoyono government was popular enough

10

Government of Indonesia Law No. 4/2009 on Mineral and Coal.
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to result in reelection just three months later after its passing (Van der Pas & Damanik,
2014). The new law included specific details aimed at encouraging firms to shift more
mining production activities (refining, smelting, etc.) back to within the Indonesian State,
prior to their being exported. The new regulation also sought to limit foreign ownership
by requiring that “foreign-owned mining industries progressively divest to become a
shareholder minority within 10 years,” essentially forcing all foreign mining companies
to sell “parts of their shares to the Indonesian government, municipalities or local
industries – up to 51% within ten years” (Van der Pas & Damanik, 2014). 11
American mining company Newmont, the world’s 15th largest mining firm as of
2015,12 claimed the legislative changes lead directly to a forced halting of all operations
and eventually the total closure of the Batu Hijau mine. After negotiations broke down
between both mining and government officials, a special agreement was offered to the
two main mining firms, Newmont and Freeport (another affected mining company).
Freeport took up the following provisions according to Van der Pas and Damanik as
reported in their 2014 briefing:
● Required to sell only 30% of company shares to the government.
● Pay an export tax of 7.5% instead of 25%, then zero after the completion
of a local smelter was built and operational.
● Pay a ‘significantly reduced’ export duty until 2016, then higher royalties
on copper and gold sales.

11Article

112, Law No. 4/2009 was intended to coerce miners to develop mining processing plants in
Indonesia, a wider strategy by the Indonesian government to secure a greater share of its mineral resources
(Van der Pas &Damanik, 2014).
12Rankings of mining company sizes: www.mining.com 2017
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Freeport Chief Executive Richard Adkerson later called it, “a compromise to
create a bridge for us so that we can return to normal operations” (Van der Pas &
Damanik, 2014). These conditions were extended to Newmont as well, but Newmont
decided to decline and instead used its legal right to pursue arbitration using ISDS, from
within an agreed upon Indonesia-Netherlands BIT which was initially signed in 1968
(2014). Newmont then took the case against Indonesia before ICSID in July of 2014. 13
Newmont’s official summary of the dispute using ISDS stated,
“claims arising out of the introduction of export restrictions on copper, including an
export duty and a ban on the export of copper concentrate which allegedly stalled
production at the Batu Hijau copper and gold mine operated by the claimants” (ICSID,
2017).
The case was discontinued by Newmont within the same year, after “it had
reached an agreement with the Indonesian government, giving the mining company
special exemptions from the new mining law” (Van der Pas & Damanik, 2014). The
official amount being claimed by Newmont at the time of the ICSID suit was not publicly
available but has been speculated near $1 billion (USD). Indonesia later publicly
announced that it would allow its BIT with the Netherlands to expire in the following
year and did not plan to renew. Indonesia has further announced it will seek the
cancellation of some 60 FTAs and BITs containing the ISDS clauses specifically. Despite
allowing the Dutch treaty to expire, special ‘survivor-clauses’ protections remain immune
to the expiration, and in effect will continue to temporarily guard the agreement. This will

13BIT

Indonesia - Netherlands 1994. Nusa Tenggara v. Indonesia, Nusa Tenggara Partnership B.V. and PT
Newmont Nusa Tenggara v. Republic of Indonesia (ICSID Case No. ARB/14/15).
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therefore continue to leave Indonesia vulnerable to ISDS lawsuits via the Dutch BIT until
2030, despite its expiration (Van der Pas & Damanik, 2014).
According to Riza Damanik, the Chairman of Kesatuan Nelayan Traditional
Indonesia (KNTI), “the impact of Bilateral Investment Treaties is not just shown in the
cases brought to tribunals that rule against states’ rights to regulate and protect citizens,
but also in the many cases that do not make it to ICSID because states backtrack on
regulation for fear of lawsuits” (Van der Pas & Damanik, 2014). Damanik explains that
this RCE is often “difficult to show...because governments that backtrack in [the] face of
threats often do so without public knowledge and because agreements with corporations
are made between closed doors. The case of Newmont against Indonesia, however, shows
the consequences that arise from a mere threat of a billion dollar claim in response to a
(proposed) new policy” (2014).

5.3 Analysis and Summary of Section One
Initially signed in 1968, the case brought against the Indonesian State by
Newmont Mining 14serves as a strong example for three specific issues discussed in this
inquiry. First, the year it was signed reflects a period characterized earlier by abuse.
Second, the issues regarding ISDS and potentials for RCE are evident. Third, it
emphasizes the impact from treaties which contain no savings provisions.
The BIT between Indonesia and the Netherlands in this case was signed in 1968,
coming into force soon after in 1971. This timeframe helps to orient the outcome of the

14In

2016 PT Newmont Nusa Tenggara took the action of liquidating all remaining shares to PT Amman
Mineral Nusa Tenggara.
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discontinued case in 2014, by suggesting it was framing an era that commonly did not
include savings provisions- which in fact it did not have in either the preamble or any
other clause according to IIA Mapping Data. Likewise, the year reflects the disparity in
wealth. At the time of the 2014 ICSID case, the disparity was very low, measuring on a
difference of $200 million (USD) in favor of the Netherlands. However, when looking at
the disparity in 1968, the gap was much wider. In 1968 Indonesia had a GDP of $7.076
billion (USD) compared to the Netherlands' $27.82 billion (USD), a disparity total of
$20.744 billion (USD).
Secondly, the RCE in this case is clear. There was a decision to exempt the
foreign investor directly from the application of a regulatory policy decision popular
enough to result in a reelection of government, yet the policy was not enforced due to an
ISDS outcome.
The third issue this case displays, is that of savings provision inclusion. While the
treaty was signed in a previous era, already identified widely as being flawed for a lack of
such inclusions, the decision was made later to include this contractual language. In later
replacement BIT with the Netherlands, Indonesia moved to include a ‘reference to the
right to regulate’ in a subsequent chapter, thereby providing a legal defense against
arbitration regarding future mistreatment as a result of policy creation. There has been no
other ISDS arbitration between the Netherlands and Indonesia since the 2014 case, based
either on the expired or on the re-drafted BIT since.
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5.4 Section Two - Case Examples of Regulatory Chilling Effect (RCE)
Case Selection
The following two cases were chosen due to their ability to typify regulatory
chilling concerns involving the US and Canada. These cases are not reviewed in depth, as
other extensive case studies examining RCE already exist, not only involving the US, but
many global IIAs. The summary of this section examines in greater depth the process
used to analyze RCE cases in general, discussing the views of recent literature regarding
their study.
Case Reviews
●
●
●
●

#1 Case Detail Overview
Case Name: Chemtura vs. Canada
IIA: NAFTA (1992)
Year of Case Initiation: 2002
US firm Chemtura alleged $100 million (USD) in damages against Canadian

regulation that banned the agro-chemical known as Lindane, a chemical frequently used
as an insecticide but that can emit toxic hydrochloric acid when decomposed through
heat. The Canadian government banned its use on the grounds that if posed a health and
environmental risk to consumers. An ISDS arbitration panel ultimately rejected the claim
of the investor. The U.S. government dissent, stating that the decision, “tribunal showed
deference to the government’s scientific and environmental regulatory determinations”
(USTR, 2015).
●
●
●
●

#2 Case Detail Overview
Case Name: Methanex vs. the United States
IIA: NAFTA (1992)
Year of Case Initiation: 1999
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The Canadian Methanex Corporation alleged $970 million (USD) in injuries
which resulted from a Californian regulation that banned the use of a gasoline additive
Methyl tert-butyl ether (MTBE). The additive, created to oxygenate and increase gasoline
octane, was deemed hazardous and a threat to groundwater when spilled. Ensuing
arbitration “underscored the right of governments to regulate for public purposes,
including regulation that imposes economic burdens on foreign investors, and stated that
investors could not reasonably expect that environmental and health regulations would
not change” (USTR, 2015). The U.S. stated that the “tribunals adjudicating ISDS cases
under U.S. agreements have consistently affirmed that government actions designed and
implemented to advance legitimate regulatory objectives do not violate investment
obligations” (USTR, 2015).

Additional Findings on RCE Relationship - Canada and US
Additional reading on the subject of RCE effects between Canada and the US,
offer a revealing informality with regards to regulatory pressure. William Greider,
writing for The Nation, has stated that the former US Trade Representative Carla Hills,
“oversaw the NAFTA negotiations for Bush Sr. and now heads her own trade-consulting
firm” (Greider, 2001), with intimate knowledge of how foreign investors specifically act
to threaten states with ISDS in regards to their regulation. Greider has written about a
specific incident involving the Canadian Ottawa government and Hills’ two big tobacco
clients R.J. Reynolds and Philip Morris. Hills purportedly sent Julius Katz, who had
previously been her chief deputy while working as the US Trade Rep. to, “warn Ottawa
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to back off its proposed law to require plain packaging for cigarettes.” Otherwise Katz
had said, “Canada would have to compensate his clients under NAFTA” (Greider, 2001).
Greider described that the Canadian Health Minister responded by saying, "No
US multinational tobacco manufacturer or its lobbyists are going to dictate health policy
in this country" (Greider, 2001). Greider then reported later that Canada did indeed drop
the proposed smoking regulation and other such policies. Greider continues by quoting a
former government official from Ottawa who said that, “I've seen the letters from the
New York and DC law firms coming up to the Canadian government on virtually every
new environmental regulation and proposition in the last five years. They involved drycleaning chemicals, pharmaceuticals, pesticides, patent law. Virtually all of the new
initiatives were targeted and most of them never saw the light of day" (Greider, 2001).

5.5 Analysis and Summary of Section Two
The brief exploration of case studies here only adds to a growing number of
examples in which there is substantial reason to accept the occurrence of RCE. Christine
Côté examines more cases which exhibit this effect, but in line with discussions described
in the literature review, her examples center around cases which took place in the 1990’s,
when provisions that protected the rights to regulate were more infrequent. She includes
in her study some of the following examples:
● 1997, Metalclad Corp vs. The Government of Mexico, case claiming
$96,000,000.00 (US) and involving hazardous waste.
● 1997, Ethyl Corporation vs. The Government of Canada, case claiming
$347,000,000.00 (US) and involving a gasoline additive.
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● 1999, Methanex Corporation vs. The Government of the United States,
case claiming $970,000,000.00 (US) and involving a gasoline additive.
● 1998, S.D. Meyers vs. The Government of Canada, case claiming
$10,000,000.00 (US) and involving PCB waste disposal.
These examples include many ISDS cases between Mexico, Canada and the US
however, in which adjudicated regulatory complaints occurred under NAFTA’s Chapter
11. Unlike the many IIAs and BITs which have been coded and quantified here,
NAFTA’s Chapter 11 interprets regulatory action with regard to equitable treatment more
irregularly, as the second part of this qualitative section has illustrated. It is therefore
more difficult to draw conclusions from these examples alone and will presumably
continue to be if there exist no appellate body from which to codify results and set lasting
precedents. More precise language in regard to regulatory rights have been included
within the most recent United State-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). This
increased specificity helped encourage Canadian involvement, particularly given its
contentious efforts regarding regulatory action in the past (Ferris, 2018).
While directly linking RCE to ISDS disputes is difficult for exactly the reasons
that Van der Pas and Damanik point out in the Newmont Mining v. Indonesia case
examined in the first section, the accumulation of cases and the building of evidence in
the form of direct sources concerning their decision making seems to be the beginning to
further research substantiating the RCE presence.
There is evidence that indeed the size and respective influence of the investor’s
home state plays too great a role to deny. To begin with, the United States has never lost
an ISDS case. Canada, with a GDP roughly a tenth the size of the US, has faced the

66

highest number of arbitrations of any nation, directly attributable to ISDS (Barlow,
2015). The US’s ability to impact a country’s trade revenues based upon such things as
‘preferred-trading-partner’ lists (example from Argentina) and willingness/ability to put
forth the time and monetary assets required to launch lawsuits that can average 3.6 years
and cost an average of $8 million (US).
In a 1999 ISDS case which demonstrates this, the U.S. was sued by Canada for
nearly a billion dollars (USD) after the State of California banned a specific toxic
gasoline additive (Côté, 2014). While there may be evidence that congress took
momentary pause, it is difficult to find any actual chilling with regards to regulation.
Canada is meanwhile currently pursuing a $15 billion (USD) settlement through ICSID
against the U.S. for failing to approve the Keystone XL pipeline. The main argument is
politicization of the pipeline, attributed to showing Canada unfair treatment under
NAFTA’s Chapter 11 rules. The US was clearly willing to risk the 15-billion-dollar
lawsuit potentially because it deemed the negative political impact of approving the
pipeline to be more damaging. This implies that the US government may be both
comfortable in its ability to coerce the Canadian government effectively than it can itself
be coerced, and/or also that its own legal framework (despite NAFTA’s inability to
provide adequate savings clauses to other nations) can withstand the suit. The suit could
have profound consequences near and far should it proceed and potentially be found in
Canada’s favor.
Thus far RCE has been suggested to occur in a few specified instances, but due to
ISDS having a historically non-transparent arbitration process, it has been difficult to
provide a body of conclusive evidence that solidifies it with certainty. The Freedom of
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Information Act has assisted the access of some foreign internal government’s decisionmaking process, such as with Guatemala (Kennard, 2015), Indonesia (Van der Pas and
Damanik, 2014) and Canada (Greider, 2001), which have offered insights to its nature.
Supporters of ISDS who dismiss the power of RCE, state that foreign firms do not
influence the policy decision making processes abroad or domestically (Hufbauer, 2015),
instead contending that IIAs most often do two things: guard the State’s ability to
regulate in the public interest and increase regulation overall 15 (USTR, 2015). Statistical
data revealing more frequent losses of ISDS arbitration by investors over States supports
this (European Commission, 2015). However, it can be terribly misleading, as cost and
benefit analysis of policy effects are difficult to measure even when events are well
defined.
Settlement awards, having run into the billions, put developing countries at great
risk by their inability to incur the arbitration costs alone. There is limited recourse in
these instances, given that ISDS judgements are binding and by their nature largely
facilitated and enforced through a wider global financial coercion system. This system is
operated by wealthier States, which reinforce the cycle. However, investors remind
opponents often that states seek IIA regardless of these risks, in exchange for the ability
to secure investment. This too is challenged, evidenced by Brazil which exhibits a total
lack of ISDS mechanisms within its IIAs, yet continues to attract massive foreign
investment.

15A

recent study by the Organization of American States found that CAFTA-DR countries have improved
over 150 existing environmental laws and regulations and adopted 28 new laws and regulations related to
wastewater, air pollution, and solid waste (USTR, 2015).
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Brazil aside, the picture cases discussed here arguably creates further legitimacy
for concern for RCE. A new level of economic leverage is emerging as a result, by which
foreign investors tilt the consideration process of policy legislation out of the hands of
home populations. A legitimate threat to a state's ability to regulate in its public interest is
therefore emerging and is of great concern.
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Chapter 6 - Conclusion
6.1 Conclusion
If confidence in international economic institutions to render judgements which
are impartial to non-legal influences become suspect, then their durability will erode.
This inquiry has investigated the current disagreement on whether or not power
imbalances are reflected inordinately within ISDS arbitration outcomes between host
nations and their foreign investors. Although there have been clear instances which
question any observer’s view of ISDS impartiality, these outcomes have also served to
distort a complicated fabric of case results that have changed and evolved both in time
and space.
By specifically comparing results from the UNCTAD International Investment
Database with the newly created IIA Mapping Project, it has been possible to test for
correlational evidence between ISDS decisions and the presence of savings provision
clauses. These clauses have been championed by ISDS proponents as a corrective
measure with the power to restore faith in international judicial outcomes. With the
creation of a near comprehensive and originally curated dataset, the results of this inquiry
have revealed a modest but measurable correlation between the presence of savings
provisions and the decision of ISDS arbitration to be decided in favor of a state.
However, this correlation has unexpectedly returned an AME with a negative signing,
indicating saving provisions reduce the probability of successful defense by 21% for host
states. Although contrary to the hypotheses H1 and H2, this finding may not entirely
negate the basis of either. When considered as having been run as a ‘hard test,’ these
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results may have the potential to imply further research design is needed to capture those
cases which are not pursued (and therefore not concluded) due to the natural legal
defensiveness that savings provisions may provide. Indeed, the great majority of cases
analyzed here did not contain savings provisions, and the resulting lack of concluded case
data for arbitration in which a savings provision was present, may have severely distorted
these outcomes. It is a powerful finding in itself to find so few cases in this category at
all. Securing a measure by which to gauge any deterrence that savings provisions provide
would more adequately test the efficacy of Hufbauer’s and other proponent’s legalistic
view that ISDS can be positively administered by improving contractual design.
These findings and the additional qualitative analysis given here, bolster support
for the further study and inclusion of savings provisions as a meaningful improvement in
state-investor contractual defense and the maintenance of international confidence
regarding the durability of international economic institutions.
Among the calls to improve international economic governing institutions such as
ICSID by installing permanent adjudicators, increasing transparency and creating
appellate mechanisms- the inclusion of savings provisions within international
agreements should also be pursued in order to expand international legal legitimacy. This
inquiry has shown that despite disparities in national wealth, the inclusion of savings
provisions can indeed have a measurable effect on discouraging impartiality seen
otherwise as a result of economic power discrepancy.
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Chapter 7 - Future Research
7.1 Third Party Arbitration Services
Adding to the potential for regulatory chilling and the impartiality of economic
power disparity, is the existence of third-party investors. Third party investors provide
full or partial funding for the legal costs incurred by investors throughout the arbitration
process. There is a demand for this financial assistance, since the average length and cost
of the arbitration alone is measured in years and by the millions of dollars (Gaukrodger &
Gordon, 2012). If successful, a portion of the final settlement award is then paid back to
this third party (plus a profit), thus creating a potentially lucrative incentive to generate
further cases not solely based on merit, but also on chance. This has the potential to
magnify any overall effect of a regulatory chill, and certainly also has the potential to
negate impartial adjudication in favor of cases fought via economic attrition. This could
be of particular threat, given the current absence of any appellate mechanisms.
It is therefore of great interest to know where sovereignty is most vulnerable, and
to what degree it has been threatened by investor’s ability to secure economic recourse. 16
Future research would propose further direct-source research and interviews to more
deeply uncover and understand the causes and connections necessary for RCE and courtimpartiality to occur as a direct or indirect result of these third party investors.

by the OECD puts “the average legal and arbitration costs for a claimant” at about an average
$8 million (US) and have reached into the billions now as well. (Gaukrodger & Gordon 2012).
16Research
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Appendix
I.

Quantitative Methods Section Three (Extension - Cross Tabulation)
The design of the cross tabulations presented here, divides GDP disparity into

eight brackets. GDP discrepancy has been measured in the year in which the arbitration
was first initiated. The decision to divide GDP disparity into eight was chosen to reflect a
moderate spectrum, with the $500-$700 billion (USD) bracket represented in the center,
reflecting the world’s GDP mode. Brackets were calculated by subtracting host State
GDP from investor’s home country GDP. The negative bracket is used to designate those
instances in which the nation being brought to arbitration had a higher GDP than the
nation from which an investor’s suit originated. All figures are represented in billions of
dollars (USD).
The design of the data set used here is the same as the design used in Quantitative
Analysis Section One and Two. The collection method, use of the UN and University IIA
Mapping Project Database is the same, as well as the method by which disparity between
host nations and investor’s home nations was calculated.
II.

Results

Cross-tabulation analysis of Zero-Order Results
Table D-1 displays the preliminary zero-order relationship results, presented in a
cross-tabulation analysis. The following results reflect the entirety of treaties studied
here, as only treaties containing ISDS clauses within them were examined. Treaties with
or without saving provisions included (either in the preamble or elsewhere in textual
body) are likewise included.
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Table D-1
All Treaties
with ISDS

GDP
Disc.

GDP
Disc.

GDP
Disc.

GDP
Disc.

GDP
Disc.

Was the
ISDS dispute
successfully
Less than $100 - $300 Defended (i.e Negative
$100
$300
$500
decided in
favor of
State)?
1. Yes

0. No

Total (n)

Probability of
successful
defending

55.6%

54.5%

(20)

(6)

44.4%

45.5%

(16)

(5)

100.0%

58.3% 51.9%
(14)

(10)

(13)

GDP
Disc.

GDP
Disc.

$900 $1,100

$1,100 $1,300

More than
$1,300

40.9%

66.7%

44.4%

78.6%

51.9%

(9)

(16)

(4)

(11)

(81)

59.1%

33.3%

55.6%

21.4%

48.1%

(13)

(8)

(5)

(3)

(75)

100.0%

100.0%

100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

(36)

(11)

55.6%

54.5%

(24)

(27)

58.3% 51.9%

GDP Disc.

$500 - $700 –
$700 $900

(14)

41.7% 48.1%

GDP
Disc.

(22)

(24)

(9)

(14)

(156)

40.9%

66.7%

44.4%

78.6%

51.9%

Introduction of Multiple Independent Variables and their Coefficients
This study next extends to accommodate the second independent variable, the
presence of a savings provision within the treaty. Tables D-2 and D-3 display these
results in a cross-tabulation analysis, controlling for the inclusion of a savings provision
within a contract.
Table D-2
NO savings
provision
Present

GDP
Disc.

GDP
Disc.

GDP
Disc.

GDP
Disc.

GDP
Disc.

GDP
Disc.

GDP
Disc.

Was the ISDS
dispute
successfully
Defended (i.e
decided in favor
Less than
of State)?
Negative $100

$100 $300

$300 $500

$500 $700

$700 - $900 $900 $1,100

1. Yes

58.3%

54.2%

53.3%

65.2%

55.6%

54.5%

33.3%

GDP
Disc.

GDP
Disc.

$1,100 $1,300

More
than
$1,300

75.0%

54.3%
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0. No

Total (n)

Probability of
successful
defending

(20)

(6)

(14)

(13)

(8)

(15)

(2)

(9)

(75)

44.4%

45.5%

41.7%

45.8%

46.7%

34.8%

66.7%

25.0%

45.7%

(16)

(5)

(10)

(11)

(7)

(8)

(4)

(3)

(63)

100.0%

100.0%

(36)

(11)

(24)

(24)

(15)

(23)

(6)

(12)

(138)

55.6%

54.5%

58.3%

54.2%

53.3%

65.2%

33.3%

75.0%

54.3%

GDP
Disc.

GDP
Disc.

GDP
Disc.

GDP
Disc.

GDP
Disc.

GDP
Disc.

100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

100.0%

Table D-3
Saving Provision
IS Present

GDP
Disc.

GDP
Disc.

GDP
Disc.

Was the ISDS
dispute
successfully
Defended (i.e.
decided in favor of
State)?
Negative

Less
than
$100

$100 $300

$300 $500

$500 $700

$700 - $900 $900 $1,100

$1,100 $1,300

More
than
$1,300

1. Yes

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

33.3%

14.3% 100.0% 66.7%

100.0%

33.3%

(0)

(0)

(0)

(1)

(1)

(1)

(2)

(2)

(6)

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

66.7%

85.7%

0.0%

33.3%

0.0%

66.7%

(0)

(0)

(0)

(2)

(6)

(0)

(1)

(0)

(12)

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

(0)

(0)

(0)

(3)

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

33.3%

0. No

Total (n)

Probability of
successful
defending

100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
(7)

(1)

(3)

14.3% 100.0% 66.7%

100.0%

(2)

(18)

100.0%

33.3%

